Economy

Africa Critical Minerals and the Global EV Battery Race: US-China Competition Intensifies

Africa holds approximately 70 percent of global cobalt reserves and 30 percent of lithium reserves, making the continent a decisive battleground in the US-China competition for dominance of the electric vehicle battery supply chain.

By Zawadi MwangiAfrica5-minute read25 Apr 2026☆ Save ↗ Share ⎙ Print

The global race for electric vehicle battery supremacy has turned Africa's mineral wealth into one of the most strategically contested terrains of the 21st century. With the continent holding approximately 70 percent of the world's cobalt reserves, 30 percent of its lithium reserves, and significant deposits of manganese, graphite, nickel, and rare earth elements, African nations have found themselves at the center of a geopolitical competition between the United States and China that will shape the energy transition for decades to come.

The scale of the opportunity is staggering. Global EV battery demand is projected to grow from 780 gigawatt-hours in 2025 to 3,500 gigawatt-hours by 2030, requiring approximately 2.8 million tonnes of lithium, 1.4 million tonnes of cobalt, and 3.2 million tonnes of nickel. The total addressable market for battery raw materials is expected to reach $380 billion by 2030, up from approximately $95 billion in 2025. Africa's share of this market, if fully developed, could generate between $50 billion and $80 billion in annual export revenue by the end of the decade.

China currently dominates the African critical minerals landscape with an estimated $65 billion in cumulative mining investments across the continent. Chinese firms control approximately 68 percent of the DRC's cobalt refining capacity, 40 percent of Zimbabwe's lithium production, 50 percent of Guinea's bauxite output, and significant positions in South Africa's platinum and manganese sectors. China also controls approximately 78 percent of global battery cell manufacturing capacity and 85 percent of battery precursor materials processing, giving it an integrated supply chain from African mine to Chinese battery factory.

The United States, by contrast, has been a relative latecomer to African mineral development. The US Critical Minerals Strategy, updated in 2025, identified Africa as a "priority region for supply chain diversification" and committed to mobilizing $8 billion in public and private investment through the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the US International Development Finance Corporation, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. However, actual disbursements have lagged behind commitments, with only $1.2 billion in approved financing for African mining projects as of April 2026.

The US-Africa Critical Minerals Dialogue, launched at the US-Africa Leaders Summit in December 2022, has produced several bilateral agreements. The most significant is the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the US and the DRC in April 2023, which committed to developing a "responsible supply chain" for cobalt and other battery minerals. Under the agreement, the US has supported the creation of an artisanal cobalt cooperative framework covering 14 mining sites in Lualaba province, and has provided $45 million in technical assistance for mining governance reform.

However, Chinese firms continue to outpace their American competitors in terms of investment speed and scale. In the past 18 months alone, Chinese companies have announced new mining investments in Africa totaling $7.8 billion, including CMOC Group's $2.5 billion expansion of the Tenke Fungurume copper-cobalt mine in the DRC, Zijin Mining's $1.2 billion Kamoa-Kakula expansion, and Huayou Cobalt's $800 million lithium processing plant in Zimbabwe.

Ambassador Johnnie Carson, former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and now a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, described the competitive dynamic as "fundamentally asymmetric." Speaking at a conference on critical minerals in Pretoria on April 12, Carson said: "China approaches African mining with a single coordinated strategy backed by state-owned enterprises, policy banks, and diplomatic leverage. The US approach, by contrast, is fragmented across multiple agencies, relies primarily on private sector initiative, and lacks a coherent Africa-wide strategy. We are competing with one hand tied behind our back."

The geopolitical dimension has been further complicated by the EU's Critical Raw Materials Act, which entered into force in 2024 and set targets for 10 percent of critical mineral consumption to come from domestic extraction, 40 percent to be processed within the EU, and 25 percent to come from recycling by 2030. The Act has prompted European companies and governments to seek direct partnerships with African mineral-producing countries, creating a third pole in the competition alongside the US and China.

In March 2026, the EU and Zambia signed a Strategic Minerals Partnership worth $1.4 billion, including $600 million for the development of a lithium-ion battery precursor materials processing plant in Ndola and $450 million for rail infrastructure linking the Copperbelt to the Lobito Corridor. The EU has also committed $350 million to a green hydrogen and battery materials partnership with Namibia and $200 million for manganese processing in South Africa.

African governments are attempting to leverage this competition to secure better terms. The African Minerals Development Centre (AMDC), an African Union agency, has been working to develop a continent-wide critical minerals strategy that would establish minimum standards for investment agreements, local content requirements, and environmental protection. The strategy, expected to be presented at the AU summit in February 2027, proposes the creation of an African Critical Minerals Bank with initial capitalization of $10 billion, financed by a combination of member state contributions, African Development Bank lending, and sovereign wealth fund participation.

Dr. Socrates Mahunka, the AMDC's executive director, argued that African nations must move beyond the "extract and export" model that has characterized the continent's relationship with mineral wealth since colonial times. "If we continue to export raw lithium, raw cobalt, and raw copper while others build the batteries, the electric vehicles, and the technologies of the future, we will have missed the most important economic opportunity of our generation," Mahunka said in an interview in Addis Ababa on April 8. "The question is not whether the world needs African minerals -- it does, desperately. The question is whether Africa will capture a meaningful share of the value chain or remain a raw material supplier in a value chain controlled by others."

The challenges are enormous. Africa's mineral processing capacity remains minimal: the continent processes less than 5 percent of its own mineral output. Infrastructure gaps, energy deficits, skills shortages, and governance weaknesses all constrain the continent's ability to move up the value chain. Yet the opportunity is equally enormous. If African nations can coordinate their bargaining positions, invest in processing infrastructure, and insist on meaningful technology transfer, the critical minerals boom could catalyze the kind of industrial transformation that has eluded the continent for decades.

The EV battery race is not just about technology or markets. It is about which countries and which companies will control the building blocks of the 21st-century economy. For Africa, the stakes could not be higher.