Boko Haram's Evolving Threat: Insurgency Shifts Tactics as Military Claims Gains

The Nigerian military's campaign against insurgency in the North-East has entered a paradoxical phase. On one hand, the armed forces have achieved measurable territorial gains, reclaiming significant portions of Borno State that had been under insurgent control and degrading the operational capacity of both Boko Haram and its splinter faction, the Islamic State West Africa Province. On the other hand, the insurgency has demonstrated a troubling capacity for adaptation, shifting from conventional territorial control to asymmetric warfare that presents a different and arguably more complex challenge.

In the first quarter of 2026, the military reported killing or capturing over 1,200 insurgents and rescuing approximately 850 hostages across multiple operations in the Sambisa Forest, the Lake Chad basin, and the Mandara Mountains. Defence Headquarters spokesperson Major General Edward Buba described the operations as "the most sustained and effective offensive against terrorist elements in the theatre since 2017."

Yet the same period saw a spike in improvised explosive device attacks, ambushes on civilian convoys, and targeted assassinations of local government officials and traditional leaders — tactics that require far fewer fighters but generate disproportionate fear and disruption.

The Territorial Picture

The military's territorial gains are real and significant. According to the Borno State Emergency Management Agency, approximately 70 percent of communities displaced by the insurgency between 2009 and 2023 have now been reopened for return. The towns of Gwoza, Bama, and Konduga, once epicentres of insurgent activity, are now under government control, with Nigerian Army forward operating bases providing security cover.

Operation Hadin Kai, the military's counter-insurgency campaign in the North-East, has benefited from improved intelligence cooperation with regional partners through the Multinational Joint Task Force, which includes troops from Chad, Niger, Cameroon, and Benin. The deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles — acquired through a $2 billion military procurement package announced in 2024 — has enhanced the military's surveillance capability, allowing for more precise targeting of insurgent concentrations.

Chief of Defence Staff General Christopher Musa told the National Assembly in March that the military had "effectively degraded the insurgent groups' capacity to hold territory and mount large-scale conventional operations." He cited the recapture of several key logistics hubs and the destruction of approximately 200 insurgent camps and ammunition dumps in the preceding six months.

The Asymmetric Shift

However, military analysts and humanitarian organisations caution against equating territorial gains with the defeat of the insurgency. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project reported that insurgent incidents in the North-East increased by 15 percent in the first quarter of 2026 compared to the same period in 2025, even as the average number of fighters involved in each incident declined. The shift toward smaller, more dispersed attacks suggests a deliberate tactical adaptation.

"We are seeing a classic insurgency evolution," said Dr. Nnamdi Obasi, senior analyst at the International Crisis Group. "When denied territorial control, insurgent groups shift to guerrilla tactics — hit-and-run raids, IED attacks on supply routes, targeted killings of collaborators, and infiltration of communities. These tactics are harder to counter and can sustain the conflict indefinitely."

The most alarming development has been the emergence of drone capability among insurgent elements. In February 2026, a makeshift explosive-laden drone struck a military convoy near Damboa, killing three soldiers and wounding seven. While the device was crude — reportedly assembled from commercially available components — the incident marked the first confirmed use of unmanned aerial systems by Boko Haram or ISWAP elements in the Nigerian theatre.

Security officials told reporters that they had intercepted components for approximately 30 additional drone devices in a raid on an insurgent logistics cache near the Cameroon border in March. The Defence Ministry has since accelerated the deployment of counter-drone systems, including electronic jamming equipment, to forward operating bases in Borno and Yobe.

The Humanitarian Cost

The human toll of the conflict remains staggering. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that approximately 2.2 million people remain internally displaced in the North-East, down from a peak of 3.2 million in 2021 but still representing one of the largest displacement crises on the African continent.

Food insecurity remains acute. The Cadre Harmonise, a regional food security analysis framework, projected that approximately 4.8 million people in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states would face crisis-level food insecurity between June and August 2026, with 560,000 at risk of famine-like conditions if humanitarian access continues to be constrained by insecurity.

Access for humanitarian organisations remains a persistent challenge. In March 2026, two staff members of the International Committee of the Red Cross were abducted while travelling on the Maiduguri-Damaturu road. They were released after two weeks, but the incident underscored the fragility of the operating environment. The UN estimates that approximately 800,000 people in hard-to-reach areas remain beyond the reach of humanitarian assistance.

Community Resilience and Reconciliation

Amid the security challenges, there are signs of grassroots resilience and nascent reconciliation efforts. The Borno State government, under Governor Babagana Umara Zulum, has established a deradicalisation and reintegration programme that has enrolled approximately 3,500 former combatants since 2024. The programme, supported by funding from the European Union and the World Bank, combines vocational training, psychological counselling, and community-based reconciliation processes.

Traditional leaders in several communities have also initiated dialogue with low-level insurgent fighters, offering amnesty and reintegration support in exchange for surrender. The programme has had modest success: approximately 1,200 fighters and their families have surrendered through these channels since mid-2025, though analysts note that the majority are rank-and-file members rather than commanders.

"These initiatives are important, but they are not a substitute for addressing the root causes of the conflict," said Dr. Hakeem Lawal, a conflict resolution expert at the University of Maiduguri. "Poverty, exclusion, poor governance, and environmental degradation in the Lake Chad region created the conditions for insurgency. Until those structural issues are addressed, the risk of recurrence will persist."

Regional and International Dimensions

The conflict's regional dimensions continue to evolve. The Multinational Joint Task Force, headquartered in N'Djamena, has intensified operations along the porous borders between Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, aiming to disrupt insurgent logistics and cross-border movement. The Lake Chad basin, once a haven for ISWAP fighters, has seen increased naval and aerial patrols.

Niger's political transition following the 2023 military coup has introduced new complexities. The junta in Niamey initially signalled a willingness to cooperate with Nigeria on counter-terrorism, but relations have cooled in recent months amid disagreements over the management of shared water resources and the movement of displaced populations. Defence officials in Abuja have expressed concern that instability in Niger could create new safe havens for insurgent elements.

International partners, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, continue to provide intelligence, training, and logistical support to the Nigerian military. The US Africa Command maintains a drone base in Agadez, Niger, providing surveillance over the Lake Chad basin, though the facility's long-term status remains uncertain given the Nigerien junta's increasingly ambivalent posture toward Western military cooperation.

The Path Forward

There is broad consensus among analysts that a purely military solution to the insurgency is insufficient. The Nigerian government's own National Security Strategy, updated in 2025, acknowledges the need for a "whole-of-society approach" that combines military action with governance reform, economic development, and social reconciliation.

The challenge lies in implementation. The North-East Development Commission, established in 2017 to coordinate post-conflict reconstruction, has been plagued by funding shortfalls and administrative challenges. Of the 15 billion naira allocated to the commission in the 2026 budget, only 40 percent had been disbursed by the end of the first quarter, according to a National Assembly oversight report.

For the communities of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, the insurgency is not an abstract geopolitical challenge but a daily reality of loss, displacement, and uncertainty. Until the pace of reconstruction and reconciliation matches the pace of military operations, the promise of a durable peace will remain unfulfilled.

As Dr. Obasi observed: "The war against Boko Haram is being won on the battlefield. The harder war — the war for the peace that follows — has barely begun."