Sudan Warns UAE and Ethiopia Against Further Khartoum Airport Strikes
Sudan's armed forces have issued direct warnings to the UAE and Ethiopia following reported drone strikes targeting Khartoum Airport infrastructure, deepening a regional confrontation over Sudan's ongoing civil war.

Sudan's Armed Forces issued formal warnings on 5 May 2026 to both the United Arab Emirates and Ethiopia after drone strikes reportedly struck infrastructure at Khartoum Airport, according to reporting by Middle East Eye. The SAF, which controls the capital and its principal air hub, said the strikes violated Sudan's sovereignty and raised the prospect of direct regional military entanglement in a conflict that has already displaced more than ten million people since April 2023.
The SAF's public statements identified the UAE as a principal backer of the Rapid Support Forces, the paramilitary group that precipitated the war by seizing control of large portions of Darfur and central Sudan. Ethiopian involvement was presented as a separate and distinct concern, though SAF communications did not specify the nature of Ethiopia's alleged role. The timing of the strikes — during a period of intensified RSF pressure on the capital's outskirts — prompted immediate concern among regional mediators that the conflict is entering a new and more volatile phase.
Escalating Drone Warfare Over the Capital
The strikes represent a notable escalation in the means by which outside powers have sought to influence the war's outcome. Drone operations in and around Khartoum have been reported throughout the conflict, but direct strikes on airport infrastructure — rather than on troop positions or supply routes — are a qualitative departure. The airport is a strategic asset: it is the primary conduit for humanitarian access, diplomatic travel, and any future government logistics. Damaging it carries implications well beyond the immediate military calculus.
It is not yet clear from available sources whether the strikes were conducted by manned aircraft, unmanned systems, or a combination of both. What the SAF has stated is that the strikes originated from directions implicating the named actors. The UAE has not publicly acknowledged conducting any strikes. Ethiopian government channels have not issued a formal response, and it remains unclear whether Addis Ababa's alleged involvement reflects direct Ethiopian military action or support through other means.
The UAE Shadow
The UAE's role in Sudan has been a persistent point of contention in regional diplomacy. Sudan has previously raised the matter at the African Union and through bilateral channels, arguing that UAE material support for the RSF constitutes a violation of non-intervention norms. The SAF's accusation this week is the sharpest formulation yet, tying UAE actions directly to an assault on critical national infrastructure.
UAE policy toward the Red Sea corridor has grown more assertive over recent years, with expanded military and commercial footprints in the Horn of Africa. The Emirates has pursued agreements with a range of regional actors, and its relationship with Sudan's neighbours has been a consistent feature of its strategic posture. Whether UAE actions in this instance reflect a deliberate policy decision or an operational departure by proxy forces remains a matter of inference rather than confirmed fact — a distinction the available reporting does not fully resolve.
Ethiopian Dimensions
Ethiopia's alleged involvement complicates the picture in ways the sources do not fully illuminate. Ethiopia has its own strategic interests in Sudan's stability, including concerns about refugee flows, the status of al-Fashaga border territory, and the broader balance of power in the Nile basin. It has also been engaged in its own internal conflicts and regional posturing that colour how its actions are interpreted in Khartoum.
The SAF's naming of Ethiopia alongside the UAE suggests that Khartoum believes Addis Ababa's interests are now being pursued through means that cross a line. What those means are, specifically, is not articulated in the available sources. Some analysts have noted that Ethiopian air capabilities, if employed in support of the RSF, would represent a fundamentally different level of external involvement than the arms transfers and logistics support the Emirates is already accused of providing. Others suggest the SAF's statement may be a diplomatic pressure tactic aimed at rallying African Union backing. The sources do not permit a definitive resolution.
Wider Regional Implications
What is clear is that the conflict in Sudan is no longer a binary contest between the SAF and the RSF. Regional actors have positioned themselves — through material support, diplomatic signalling, and, if the accusations hold, direct military action — in ways that make a negotiated settlement more complicated and more fragile. The war has already outlasted most early predictions. A settlement would require not only agreement between the two principal belligerents but also alignment — or at least non-interference — from powers that have so far shown no inclination to step back.
The African Union and individual member states have been consulted repeatedly by Khartoum. Whether those consultations produce a diplomatic response before the next incident — whether drone-based or otherwise — will be a test of whether the regional architecture has any leverage over parties that have decided direct intervention serves their interests better than restraint.
This publication's coverage prioritises the SAF's stated position as the primary framework. The UAE and Ethiopian governments have not yet issued on-the-record responses to the accusations. This article will be updated as statements become available.