Pezeshkian's Literary Gambit: Tehran's Book Diplomacy and the Limits of Soft Power
On 16 May 2026, Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian issued a statement through the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) arguing that societies can overcome wars, extremism, and what he termed the "darkness of ignorance" only through reading and education. The framing was unambiguous: books are not merely cultural artifacts but instruments of national resilience. The question is whether Tehran's record supports that ambition.
Pezeshkian, who assumed the presidency in 2025 following a period of heightened regional tension, has staked part of his administration's public posture on cultural outreach. The May statement fits a pattern: messaging that positions Iran as a civilisational centre of learning, in contrast to the militarised and ideological face it presents to Western capitals. Whether this constitutes genuine policy or well-crafted optics is the central tension this article examines.
The stated case for books as policy
According to IRNA, Pezeshkian framed books as a counterweight to what he described as cultivated division. "Societies that read together do not fight each other," the paraphrasing implies—a narrative that positions literacy not as a domestic welfare concern but as a geopolitical stabiliser. The framing echoes a long tradition of Iranian state rhetoric that emphasises the country's literary heritage, from classical Persian poetry to the现代化 drive of the Pahlavi era and the revolutionary poster art of 1979.
What distinguishes Pezeshkian's version is the explicit anti-extremism framing. Iran has long framed itself as a counterweight to both Western cultural hegemony and Sunni radical movements. By linking books to resilience against extremism, the statement addresses multiple audiences simultaneously: a domestic one accustomed to state-directed cultural narratives, a regional one that Tehran wishes to position itself against sectarian bloodshed, and a Western one that watches for signals of moderation.
The question is whether the institutional apparatus exists to make this more than rhetorical.
Iran's literary ecosystem: heritage and constraint
Iran possesses one of the Middle East's most robust domestic publishing industries. Tehran hosts dozens of annual book fairs; Iranian novelists maintain significant readerships across the Persian-speaking diaspora; and literary translation programmes have historically operated at scale. This is not a society that has forgotten how to read.
But the ecosystem operates within red lines. Publishing houses require state licences. Content that challenges the foundational principles of the Islamic Republic—or that portrays sexual politics, religious dissent, or unapproved political history—faces restriction. Iranian writers and translators have described a system in which self-censorship is as powerful as formal censorship: the knowledge of where the lines sit shapes what gets written before a manuscript ever reaches an editor.
The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance oversees publication licensing. Independent publishers operate in a grey zone where certain subjects are manageable and others invite licence revocation. This is not unique to Iran—comparable constraints exist across the region—but it means that a presidential call for books as a tool against extremism arrives into a system where the definition of extremism is itself politically determined.
The soft power calculus
Books-and-reading diplomacy is not unique to Iran. China's Confucius Institutes, Russia's Rossotrudnichestvo cultural centres, and Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah Foundation for Arabic manuscripts all deploy literary heritage as an instrument of international standing. Tehran has its own version: the Tehran International Book Fair has expanded its foreign participation programme, and Iranian cultural attachés operate in several regional capitals.
The structural logic is straightforward. Sanctions limit Iran's ability to project hard power—military and economic options face legal and diplomatic barriers. Soft power costs less and travels further. A society that presents itself as a place of learning, reflection, and cultural depth can reshape its international image without triggering the compliance demands that accompany military normalisation talks.
Western analysts have noted that Tehran's cultural diplomacy tends to concentrate in regions where anti-American sentiment provides a receptive audience: Iraq's Shia-majority south, Lebanon, parts of the Afghan intellectual landscape. In those contexts, a message that foregrounds books rather than missiles is legible and may generate goodwill that financial assistance cannot buy.
But the reach is limited. Iran's book exports face translation infrastructure gaps—the country produces relatively few titles in languages that reach European or South Asian markets in their original form. And where Iranian state-linked cultural institutions operate, suspicion follows: the framing of books as a peace-building tool sits uneasily beside evidence of Iranian involvement in regional conflict over the same period.
What this tells us about Tehran's post-deal posture
Pezeshkian's statement arrives after a period in which Iran's nuclear programme and regional posture dominated international coverage. The statement itself is low-stakes as policy—IRNA quotes of a president speaking in general terms about reading carry no legislative weight and no funding commitments. But the fact that it was issued and disseminated signals something about how this administration wishes to be perceived.
Three things are notable. First, the framing targets domestic audiences as much as foreign ones: a president talking about books rather than uranium enrichment or militia financing offers a different kind of presence in the daily information environment. Second, the language of resilience against extremism is a claim to a particular identity—one that positions Iran as part of the solution rather than part of the problem in regional violence. Third, the medium matters: IRNA as a distribution vehicle ensures the message reaches state-controlled domestic media and the regional wire network simultaneously, maximising the signal at minimal cost.
Whether this constitutes a genuine policy pivot or a well-timed piece of strategic communication remains unclear. Iran's cultural institutions have not received new funding allocations as part of this statement. No new publishing subsidies were announced. No relaxation of content licensing was flagged. The statement reads as positioning rather than programme.
That does not make it worthless. International politics has long rewarded the capacity to tell stories about oneself differently than one's critics do. Tehran is attempting to own a narrative of intellectual depth and peace-orientation—something its adversaries have struggled to neutralise because the claim rests on genuine cultural assets. The gap between aspiration and practice, however, remains the most important question. A country that cannot guarantee its own readers access to a full spectrum of ideas will struggle to credibly claim books as a cure for extremism.
Pezeshkian's statement was distributed via IRNA on 16 May 2026. Monexus notes that state media framing around cultural diplomacy often serves dual purposes—domestic legitimation and international image management—and that separating the two requires attention to institutional incentives rather than stated intent alone.
Wire provenance
This editorial synthesis draws on the following public wire/social posts:
- https://t.me/Irna_en/12345