Trump Asks Seven Middle Eastern Nations to Join Abraham Accords

On 25 May 2026, prediction markets priced the odds of Saudi Arabia formally joining the Abraham Accords at 26% before 2027. That same day, reporting surfaced that the Trump administration had asked Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Bahrain to explore membership in the normalisation framework that has already drawn the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan into diplomatic relations with Israel since 2020.

The seven-country ask is broader in scope than any previous expansion effort. It encompasses three Gulf monarchies, two Nato allies, one Arab republic with a peace treaty going back to 1979, and Pakistan — a nuclear-armed state whose public opinion has historically treated normalisation with Israel as politically radioactive. The sources do not specify the format of Trump's outreach, or whether a formal proposal was made.

What the Accords actually are

The Abraham Accords are bilateral agreements, not a multilateral treaty. Each is struck between Israel and one Arab or Muslim-majority government, with the United States acting as architect and guarantor rather than a signatory. That structure matters: it decouples normalisation from the Palestinian question, which traditional Arab peace frameworks treated as a precondition. The Accords made normalisation the product, not a reward for prior Israeli concessions.

The Biden administration continued the framework after taking office in 2021. The current White House is now testing whether that architecture can absorb a significantly larger cohort in a compressed timeframe — and whether it can do so without the parliamentary-scale legwork, normalisation ceremonies, and public messaging campaigns that accompanied each previous accession.

The structural logic of the ask

The seven nations Trump named occupy very different positions relative to Israel. Egypt and Jordan have had peace treaties for decades; their question is whether formal Abraham Accord membership offers diplomatic or economic upside, or merely symbolic recognition of an existing status quo. Turkey and Pakistan have maintained diplomatic relations with Israel but face domestic political constraints — Erdogan's AKP draws on constituencies that view normalisation as a concession under pressure, and Pakistan's civil-military establishment has historically managed the Israel file as a tool of Gulf and Muslim-world diplomacy rather than a bilateral question to be resolved on its merits.

For the three Gulf states — Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain — the calculation runs through the Kingdom. Riyadh has made no secret of its long-term strategic drift toward Israel, including in infrastructure and investment flows, but has held back from formal recognition pending a Gaza settlement that it could sell to its own public. Qatar occupies a different position entirely: its state media and regional diplomacy have been central to hostage and ceasefire negotiations, while its relationship with Israel remains a subject of contested reporting. The sources do not specify what, if any, private assurances have been exchanged.

Trump's ask arrives at a moment when Washington's leverage over Gulf capitals is elevated — a function of arms relationships, dollar infrastructure, and the perception that regional security architecture depends on continued US engagement. Whether that leverage translates into normalisation commitments depends on calculations that the sources do not fully illuminate.

Stakes if the Accords expand

A successful expansion would give Washington a visible demonstration that its Middle East diplomacy can deliver results without a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian settlement. It would entrench Israel's regional position, accelerate intelligence and commercial ties between Tel Aviv and Gulf capitals, and provide the Trump administration with a legacy-format foreign policy achievement. For the Gulf states, formal participation offers deeper US security guarantees, access to Israeli technology partnerships, and a hedge against regional instability — but at the cost of political exposure at home and in the wider Muslim world.

The 26% on Saudi Arabia suggests markets see meaningful probability of Riyadh crossing that threshold — but not certainty. The broader seven-country ask adds complexity: managing the domestic politics of normalisation in Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, and Jordan requires calibrated public messaging that previous Accords countries mostly avoided or handled with lower-profile rollouts. If the process stalls, or if a high-profile rejection hardens the precedent, it could discourage governments that had been quietly weighing participation.

What markets are pricing — and what they are not

Polymarket's 26% figure is a market price, not a prediction. It reflects the aggregate view of traders who are pricing in what they believe is possible given available information — including the content of Trump's outreach, the known political constraints on Saudi Arabia's ruling family, and the current state of the Gaza conflict. That number will move as new information arrives.

The sources do not provide comparable odds for the other six nations in the ask, which makes broad comparison difficult. What the market data does suggest is that the Saudi question carries the most near-term weight — and that uncertainty around Riyadh's decision is itself a signal about the political difficulty of the step.

The Abraham Accords have consistently rewarded patience over speed. The UAE and Bahrain each spent years in quiet preparation before formalising their agreements. The question now is whether the Trump administration's compressed timeline can replicate that pace across a much larger and more politically varied cohort — and whether the countries being asked have the domestic bandwidth to absorb the diplomatic cost.

Monexus is tracking this developing story and will update as formal responses from the seven named governments emerge.